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A Brave New World of Stop and Frisk∗
Ron Bacigal, J.D.†
We’ve heard a lot of statistics today, and while I don’t want to
denigrate empirical studies, I do want to remind you that there are lies,
damn lies, and statistics. I would point you towards warring New York oped pieces, reacting differently to the same set of statistics. The editorials
were prompted by the New York City Police Department’s release of
figures regarding “stop and frisk” incidents within New York City.1 One
opinion piece by Bob Herbert, titled, The Shame of New York,2 (the title
“hints” at his position) referred to the statistics as establishing the city’s
“degrading, unlawful, and outright racist stop-and-frisk policies.”3 It noted
that blacks are nine times more likely than whites to be stopped by the
police, but no more likely than whites to be arrested as a result of the stop.4
Heather MacDonald wrote the counter-opinion piece in the New York
Times, published some time earlier, entitled Fighting Crime Where the
Criminals Are.5 This title invokes the famous line from the bank robber
Willie Sutton, the Bonnie and Clyde of the fifties. He would rob a bank,
they would put him in prison, he would escape, rob another bank and
∗ This Article derives from a transcript of a presentation given on Friday, March 18,
2011, at the Traffic and the War on Drugs Symposium, held by the Washington and Lee
Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice.
† Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law
1. CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, NYPD STOP-AND-FRISK STATISTICS 2009 AND
2010, http://www.ccrjustice.org/files/CCR_Stop_and_Frisk_Fact_Sheet.pdf (last visited
November 6, 2011) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social
Justice).
2. See Bob Herbert, The Shame of New York, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2010, at A23
(discussing New York’s unlawful and racist stop-and-frisk policy); see also Charles M.
Blow, Escape from New York, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2011, at A23 (discussing “the hyperaggressive police tactics that have resulted in a concerted and directed campaign of
harassment against the black citizens of this city”).
3. Herbert, supra note 2.
4. See id. (stating that the New York City Police Department’s own statistics
indicated that “[b]lacks were nine times more likely than whites to be stopped by the police,
but no more likely than whites to be arrested as a result of the stops”).
5. See Heather MacDonald, Fighting Crime Where the Criminals Are, N.Y. TIMES,
June 26, 2010, at A19 (stating that allegations of racial bias ignore how much crime
influences police department operations).
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continue the pattern. This was the age when the FBI was just beginning to
compile profiles of career criminals. The FBI asked Sutton: “Why do you
rob banks?” His answer was: “Because that’s where the money is.”
MacDonald put her variation on this theme by asserting that the police are
conducting stop and frisk operations in ethnic neighborhoods because that’s
where the crime is.6 Based on reports provided by victims, blacks
committed sixty-six percent of all violent crime in New York City,
including eighty percent of shootings and seventy-one percent of robberies.7
These editorials reacted to the same statistical report by putting two
very different spins on the raw data. While it’s always helpful to compile
empirical evidence, I suggest that we also need to look beyond the mere
numbers. If you put aside anecdotal versions of encounters between
minorities and police, the numbers themselves don’t reveal what those
encounters actually looked like. One way to get beyond the cold statistics
is to focus on the kind of specific facts that are becoming more readily
available in our technologically advancing society. I was at a judicial
conference at the University of Mississippi last week, and one of the
participants pointed out that in today’s world, modern technology may
enable us to precisely recreate factual occurrences unfiltered by post-hoc
reconstructions of the events. At present, a court reviews a challenged stop
and frisk by listening to witnesses testify as to their memory of what
occurred. Most often the witnesses are limited to the suspect who was
stopped and the officer who made the stop. Their testimony, like all
testimony, has weaknesses ranging from outright perjury to less blatant
“shading” of facts to make them more favorable to the witness with a stake
in the proceedings. Aside from this tendency to shade the facts, what is
particularly troublesome about reconstructing police-citizen encounters is
that such encounters are very stressful for all participants. The suspect
often feels threatened and harassed. The police officer often suspects that a
crime is about to occur, and if a frisk takes place it is because the suspect is
believed to be armed and dangerous to the officer, the public, or both.8 This
6. See id. (“Such stops happen more frequently in minority neighborhoods because
that is where the vast majority of violent crime occurs—and thus where police presence is
most intense.”).
7. See id. (“Based on reports filed by victims, blacks committed 66 percent of all
violent crime in New York in 2009, including 80 percent of shootings and 71 percent of
robberies.”).
8. See generally Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30–31 (1968) (permitting a police officer
to execute a reasonable search for weapons where the officer reasonably believes that his
safety or that of others is in danger).
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type of stressful situation is hardly conducive to a detached and objective
recitation of what occurred.
Most of us, including police officers, react to threatening and stressful
situations by trusting our instincts. Thus, when an officer is asked: “Why
did you stop this person?” or “Why did you frisk this person?” the honest
answer may be that my guts told me it was the right thing to do. But while
police may admit to fellow officers that they acted on their instincts, they
know they have to provide more of an explanation to a judge.9 So they tend
to fall back on familiar language that the courts have accepted in prior
cases. For example, they say that the suspect made “furtive gestures;”10 this
encounter occurred in a “high crime area”11 or this was a well-known
“open-air drug market.”12
The solution to this stereotyping of the circumstances that prompted a
police-citizen encounter may lie in bypassing a witness’ memory and
credibility by invoking the cry of ESPN commentators—“Let’s go to the
tapes.” If the NFL can use instant replay to monitor an official’s judgment,
the courts can use videotapes to review a police officer’s judgment to
engage in a stop and frisk. Videotaping has become so commonplace that,
even if none of the suspects or bystanders on the street had a cell phone
camera handy, we could make it routine procedure for police officers
walking city streets to be equipped with a camera to record all they see and
do. Everyone has seen the videotapes commonly used when police make a
vehicle stop. Perhaps the most famous one, at least to lawyers, is the
videotape in the Hiibel13 case, where the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the
9. See id. (holding that reasonable suspicion requires an officer to believe criminal
activity is afoot and to believe the suspect is “armed and presently dangerous”).
10 See U.S. v. Edmonds, 240 F.3d 55, 60–61, 64 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (concluding a
police officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry stop because of four factors,
including “furtive gestures” by the defendant).
11. See U.S. v. Singleton, 360 F.App’x 444, 446 (4th Cir. 2010) (“[The defendant’s]
presence in a high crime area carrying an unconcealed firearm, his wearing very casual
clothes indicating he was not a security officer, and his nervous and evasive conduct when
confronted by police officers, gave the officers reason to suspect [defendant] was involved in
criminal activity.”).
12. See U.S. v. Collins, 272 F. App’x 219, 222 (4th Cir. 2007) (“[P]olice received an
anonymous tip that an open air drug market was being conducted at the Park Avenue
Shopping Center.”); Brooks v. Price, 121 F. App’x 961, 963 (3d Cir. 2005) (“[A] police
officer. . . was patrolling a neighborhood in New Castle, Delaware, known to be an open-air
drug market when he observed [appellant] in a car stopped in the middle of the road.”).
13. See Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., Humboldt Cnty., 542 U.S. 177,
191 (2004) (finding that the arrest of a Terry stop suspect for refusal to identify himself, in
violation of Nevada law, did not violate Fourth Amendment prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures, and that defendant’s conviction for refusal to identify
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issue of police demanding identification from a motorist.14 While cameras
in squad cars have become standard equipment, technology is at the point
where we can equip officers on the beat with miniature video cameras in
their badge or on their shoulder. It’s not just James Bond or Batman who
can have all those wonderful gadgets.
With a video record of what actually took place out there on the street,
we don’t have to worry about the defendant testifying one way about the
facts and the police testifying the other way. Videotapes of police
interrogation of suspects have proven to be devastating evidence when they
are produced in court. When I teach my students about Miranda,15 I point
out that statistics show that the confession rate has not declined since
Miranda was decided.16 Students often look incredulous and ask, “Why
would anyone confess after being given the Miranda warnings?” The
answer can lie in form over substance because of the manner in which those
Miranda warnings are delivered.
If the police calmly and carefully explained: “You have the right to
remain silent, what you say can be used against you, so are you sure that
you want to talk to us? And you can have a lawyer free of charge. Are you
sure you don’t want to talk to a lawyer before answering our questions?” If
the warnings were given in this fashion, you probably wouldn’t have as
many confessions. But that is not the way Miranda warnings are typically
given in the real world. Many police will give the warnings in a rapid fire
staccato form with run on sentences that sound something like this: “You
have the right to remain silent anything you say can and will be used
against you in a court of law you have the right to an attorney if you cannot
afford one, one will be appointed for you, why’d you do it scumbag?”
When I suggest this kind of delivery to my students they often wonder if
himself did not violate his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination).
14. See id. at 188 (stating that a Nevada statute requiring identification is reasonable
after balancing the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment rights against the
legitimate government interest); see also ftam767, Encounter Between Larry Hiibel and
Nevada Highway Patrol, YOUTUBE (May 2, 2007), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=APyn
GWWqD8Y (last visited November 6, 2011) (showing a Nevada Highway Patrol Officer
encountering a rancher and arresting him because he refuses to cooperate).
15. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445 (1966) (finding that statements
obtained from defendants during “incommunicado interrogation in a police-dominated
atmosphere, without full warning of constitutional rights” are inadmissible as a violation of
the Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination).
16. See Yale Kamisar, On the Fortieth Anniversary of the Miranda Case: Why We
Need It, How We Got It—And What Happened to It. 5 OHIO ST. J CRIM. L. 163, 177 (2007)
(stating that “there is wide agreement that Miranda has had a negligible impact on the
confession rate”).
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I’m making it up in order to play Socratic games with them. I prove my
point by playing an actual video of officers giving “rapid fire” Miranda
warnings to a suspect in Richmond. When that tape was played in the
courtroom, the judge viewing it asked: “Is [the officer] speaking in
tongues?”17 So, “going to the tape” and viewing the actual interrogation
bypasses the weaknesses inherent in police and suspect attempts to
reconstruct what actually happened.
When video tapes are not available, the trial judge often has to decide
whether he or she believes the officer’s or the suspect’s version of what
occurred, and guess who usually wins the credibility battle? A victory for
the officer is not only a result of the officer having more credibility; it is
also a function of the officer having learned what the judge needs to hear in
order to rule for the prosecution. Over the years I have watched the
emergence of what is called “cop talk.” For example, police rarely say the
suspect got out of the car. They say he “exited” the vehicle. Police don’t
go to a scene to investigate, they “respond” to First and Broad Street. It
makes you wonder if the police are carrying on a conversation with a street
corner. But, in addition to this “cop talk” jargon, the police learn “lawyer
talk” or “court talk.” They know the proper buzz words to use, that is, the
magic words that legally justify the officer’s actions. As I mentioned
earlier, they learn to invoke language that the courts have accepted in prior
cases—for example: the suspect made “furtive gestures;” this was a “high
crime area;” or an “open-air drug market.”18
We were talking this morning about how police officers, if they are
any good, never make the same mistake twice. It’s more subtle than
outright perjury, because most police are not consciously deciding to lie to
the judge. But they learn what the courts are looking for, and the police
aim to please. So the police can please the prosecutor and the judge by
testifying that, “the stop occurred in a high crime area that operates as an
open air drug market. The defendant is well known by the police and is
under investigation for drug trafficking, and there were suspicious hand-tohand transfers of objects and money.” If you throw in enough of those buzz
words, the court is likely to approve the officer’s decision to conduct a stop
and frisk.

17. See Commonwealth v. Benjamin, 507 S.E.2d 113, 115 (Va. Ct. App. 1998) (“The
manner in which the detective read the statement to [the defendant] was so unintelligible that
it was functionally equivalent to not reading to [the defendant] the Miranda rights.”).
18. See supra text accompanying notes 10–12.
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So far I’ve focused on how video tapes could eliminate some of the
problems raised when police reconstruct the facts from the witness stand.
But until such tapes are commonly available, we can at least ask that judges
be a bit more skeptical about some of the testimony they hear and how they
evaluate the legal sufficiency of the facts. A Fourth Circuit case decided
recently, United States v. Foster,19 is a great example of how a more
discerning judiciary can react to vague “cop talk” about suspicious criminal
activity. Permit me to paraphrase what the officer recounted in Foster: I
saw a young, black man sitting there in an SUV. As I walked toward the
SUV, all of a sudden I saw another black man sit up in the passenger seat. I
didn’t know what he was doing but all of a sudden he popped up. I made
eye contact with him and I realized that he had been previously arrested for
something involving marijuana. When I made eye contact, the defendant
began shifting around and “his arms went haywire.”20
Now your guess is as good as mine as to what “haywire” means,
because the officer couldn’t see the defendant’s hands, he could only see
the arms from the elbows up.21 The officer called into the Police
Department and was told that the defendant had been “under
investigation.”22 They did not say why he was under investigation, but the
officer assumed it was for “a drug related offense.”23 The officer radioed
for assistance.24 He and another officer watched the car for fifteen minutes,
and, even though nothing had happened, the officers then “used their
respective vehicles to block the SUV in,” and approached the defendant
with their guns drawn.25
The trial court listened to this description of the encounter and decided
that this was a legitimate stop because the police officers were dealing with
a “drug-trafficker.”26 The Fourth Circuit went out of its way to say that the

19. See United States v. Foster, 634 F.3d 243, 249 (4th Cir. 2011) (stating that the
“stop of Foster by Detective Ragland was not supported by articulable facts sufficient to
provide reasonable suspicion”).
20. Id. at 248.
21. Id. at 245.
22. Id.
23. See id. (stating that Detective Ragland called the drug unit supervisor after
speaking with Foster).
24. See id. (“He also called Officer Macialek for assistance with a possible drug
arrest.”).
25. Id.
26. See id. at 245–46 (referring to Detective Ragland’s knowledge of defendant’s
criminal history).
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trial court’s ruling was clear error.27 All the officers knew was that there
had been a prior arrest involving marijuana.28 The officers did not know
whether the defendant was convicted or whether he had been arrested for
simply smoking a joint in public, which would hardly qualify him as a
drug-trafficker. Note that this decision came from the Fourth Circuit,
which is generally regarded as the most conservative circuit in the country.
And they did not merely reverse the trial court, they went on to discuss the
general nature of police officers’ renditions of suspicious circumstances:
We also note our concern about the inclination of the Government
toward using whatever facts are present, no matter how innocent, as an
indicia of suspicious activity . . . . [A]n officer and the Government
must do more than simply label a behavior as ‘suspicious’ in order to
make it so . . . . [W]e find it particularly disingenuous of the
Government to attempt to portray these arm movements as
ominous . . . . Moreover, we are deeply troubled by the way in which
the Government attempts to spin these largely mundane facts into a web
of deception. . . . [T]he Government cannot rely upon post hoc
rationalizations to validate those seizures that happened to turn up
contraband.29

This symposium is focusing on race and criminal justice, thus it is
fitting that Judge Gregory, the first black man ever appointed to the Fourth
Circuit, wrote the Foster opinion.
Coincidence?
Judge Gregory
exemplifies the need for the judiciary to demand more than buzz words like
“furtive gestures,” “drug trafficker,” or similarly vague and conclusory
terms.
While the judiciary should follow Judge Gregory’s lead, the defense
bar can also play its part by challenging and testing a police officer’s litany
of cop talk. One other case that illustrates this point is a fairly recent
Virginia case, Cost v. Commonwealth,30 where the essence of the officer’s
testimony was that: “I patted this person down and I felt a number of pills
27. See id. at 246 n. 2 (“The district court clearly erred in finding that Detective
Ragland had ‘prior knowledge that Defendant was a drug-trafficker.’”).
28. See id. at 246–47 (discussing the detective’s knowledge of the defendant’s
criminal record).
29. Id. at 248–49; see also United States v. Digiovanni, 650 F.3d 498, 512 (4th
Cir. 2011) (concluding that many of the facts relied upon by the officer “border[] on the
absurd;” for example, the officer labeled two shirts hanging in the back of the car as
“suspicious,” because “non-drug traffickers would pack the shirts in a clothing bag”).
30. See Cost v. Commonwealth, 657 S.E.2d 505, 509 (Va. 2008) (holding that there
was no probable cause to believe that the capsules discovered in defendant’s pockets during
a pat-down were an illicit drug and that officer was, therefore, unjustified in seizing the
capsules).
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in his pocket which I recognized as heroin capsules.”31 In order to apply
the Fourth Amendment’s “plain feel” doctrine,32 the officer had to be able
to identify the seizable item (the heroin) simply by patting down the
suspect’s outer clothing.33 If he manipulated the object, even while it
remained inside the pocket, this would have constituted, not a pat down, but
a full search.34 This officer testified at trial that he had “attended several
narcotics classes,”35 so he maintained that he recognized these capsules as
heroin. Both the trial court and the Virginia Court of Appeals accepted that
this “trained” officer could distinguish something like vitamin capsules
from heroin capsules by simply patting down the suspect. 36 The Virginia
Supreme Court, however, overturned the Court of Appeals and stated that:
“[I]t is self-evident that if an item may just as well be a legal medication
dispensed in capsule form or a capsule containing an illegal drug, its
character as the latter cannot be readily apparent by feeling a suspect’s
outer clothing that contains the item inside.”37
So part of the problem in this case rests with an overly solicitous
judiciary and part of the problem rests with defense counsel for letting the
officer get away with his claims at trial. How could defense counsel allow
the officer to assert that “I’ve attended several narcotics classes, so I know
what heroin capsules feel like”?38 This type of claim cries out for a cross
examination that asks: “OK, officer. Take me through this. What is it in
your drug training that developed your sense of touch to the point that you
are able to discern by patting outer clothing whether what you’re touching
31. Id. at 506.
32. See Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375 (1993) (“[I]f an officer lawfully
pats down a suspect’s outer clothing and feels an object whose contour or mass makes its
identity immediately apparent, there has been no invasion of the suspect’s privacy beyond
that already authorized by the officer’s search for weapons.”).
33. See id. (stating that when police feel an object, its identity must be immediately
apparent).
34. See id. at 378 (stating that the officer determined the lump was contraband only
after manipulating the contents of the pocket). The Supreme Court found that the lower
court “was correct in holding that the police officer in this case overstepped the bounds of
the ‘strictly circumscribed’ search for weapons allowed under Terry.” Id.
35. Cost v. Commonwealth, 638 S.E.2d 714, 716 (Va. Ct. App. 2006).
36. See id. at 719–20 (acknowledging that “feeling the capsules alone may not be
sufficient probable cause,” but combined the pat down with the familiar “furtive gesture”
rationale). The Virginia Supreme Court, however, stated that “We disagree with the Court
of Appeals’ characterization of Cost’s actions as ‘furtive.’” Cost v. Commonwealth, 657
S.E.2d 505, 508 (Va. 2008).
37. Cost, 657 S.E.2d at 508.
38. Cost, 638 S.E.2d at 716.
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is a vitamin pill or whether it’s a heroin capsule?” If defense counsel had
done their job and gotten that point across, then maybe the trial court would
never have ruled the way it did. After you have graduated and find yourself
litigating these types of issues, you need to challenge police who offer only
vague descriptions of the suspect’s suspicious conduct or of the officer’s
expertise in drug recognition. You need to push them hard about breaking
their statements down and articulating the facts, free from the officer’s
conclusory characterization of those facts. The trial judge is entitled to a
presentation of the precise facts—whether from a videotape or rigorous
cross examination.
The last comment I have today about race and the use and misuse of
stereotyping vagaries is to question whether the U. S. Supreme Court is
being realistic in insisting that the Constitution, and specifically the Fourth
Amendment, are colorblind. I want to look at the colorblind standard the
Court utilizes when it defines a “seizure of a person” for Fourth
Amendment purposes. The Court has developed three different tests for
seizure of a person, but I want to focus on the one adopted in United States
v. Mendenhall.39 In that case the Court held that whether a person has been
seized is an objective test of when a reasonably prudent person under the
circumstances understands that he or she is not free to leave.40 The Court
stressed that this is an objective standard; courts are not to look at the
subjective intent of the police officer nor are they to look at the intent or the
state of mind of the citizen.41 I wonder how realistic this approach is, in
terms of dealing with our society.
Let me give you a real world example illustrating the difference
between a wholly objective approach and an approach that takes account of
real people with real life experiences. Suppose that the police approach two
people and say: “Look, you need to come with us and submit to
interrogation or we’re going to get the grand jury to indict you.” How
would a reasonably prudent person react to that threat? Would they feel
that they’ve got a choice to walk away or do they feel that they’ve got to go
with the police now and answer those questions? I’m not sure how a
reasonably prudent person would perceive the situation. You can
39. See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554–55 (1980) (establishing an
objective test for determining whether a seizure of a person has occurred).
40. See id. at 554 (“We conclude that a person has been ‘seized’ within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident,
a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.”).
41. See id. (stating that a seizure occurs only if a reasonable person would have
believed he was not free to leave).
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objectively argue either way. But let’s relate the hypothetical to actual
people—Bill Clinton and Monica Lewinsky. I can understand a lot better
how those actual people might react to the police tactic of threatening
indictment. If you are a Rhodes Scholar with a law degree occupying the
most powerful office in the world, you’re not likely to be overly intimidated
by this type of threat. But if you are a twenty-three-year-old frightened
intern and they are threatening you with indictment by an ominous
sounding federal grand jury, do you truly feel free to ignore the threat and
simply walk away?
It is certainly a laudable ideal to adopt objective universal standards
and to maintain that our Constitution is colorblind. While this ideal would
seem a natural approach in an ideal world, it creates unequal justice in the
real world in which we live. The price for a colorblind Fourth Amendment
is that the Court ignores real people and determines constitutional rights
according to the perceptions of hypothetical persons, reasonably prudent or
otherwise. The Court should endeavor to apply the Constitution to actual
people, who must be taken with all of their personal characteristics and
experiences: race, ethnicity, where they are living, and the number and
nature of previous encounters they have had with police. Once the Court
adopts a constitutional standard that focuses on whether a person feels free
to leave, that person should be taken as he or she is, not as the Court
visualizes some hypothetical person. The title of this symposium is “Race
and Criminal Justice,” and sometimes justice requires that the Constitution
not be oblivious to race and the experiences that accompany a person’s
racial identity.

